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CASE NOTES
policy statement in Toolson that any imposition of antitrust regulation on
baseball should come prospectively from Congress and not retrospectively
from the courts."
JOSEPH GOLDBERG
Labor Law—Unfair Labor Practices—LTnion's Potential Conflict of In-
terest Relieves Employer of Duty to Bargain.—NLRB v. David Buttrick
Co. 1—This unfair labor practice proceeding arose as a result of the refusal
by the David Buttrick Company to bargain with the exclusive representative
of its employees, Local 380, an affiliate of the Teamsters Union? Local 380
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board to order the company to
bargain in good faith. Buttrick refused on the ground that the Local was
subject to a disqualifying conflict of interest. The company asserted that a
Teamsters pension fund° had made substantial loans to the Whiting Milk
Company, a direct competitor of Buttrick? Since the General President of
the Teamsters Union was also a trustee of that pension fund, he might, in
order to protect the loans, compel Local 380 to act adversely to Buttrick's
interests. The Local would then be in the position of having to choose between
two courses of action: either to bargain in good faith in behalf of the employees
it represented, or to obey the General President's orders.
The Board found that Local 380 was in no way affiliated with the pension
fund and that it had not participated in the negotiations leading to the loans.
It concluded that Buttrick had failed to show an actual conflict of interest in
Local 380 and, therefore, ordered the company to bargain.° Upon Buttrick's
continued refusal, the Board and Local 380 sought to have the order enforced
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.° That court HELD• An em-
43 Id. at 357.
1 361 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1966).
2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(5), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
3 This is the Central States, Southeast, and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. The
fund was established as a trust to administer pension funds accumulated through col-
lective bargaining agreements between employers and Teamsters locals in the central and
southern states, and through various investments. The beneficiaries of the fund are the
union-member employees of those employers who contribute to it; Local 380 derives
no benefit from this fund. The fund is administered by a committee of 16 trustees, 8
selected by the contributing employers and 8 by the union-member employees. 361 F.2d
at 302 n.2. The General President of the Teamsters Union is one of the eight union
trustees of the fund. Brief for Local 380 as Intervening Petitioner, p. 5.
4 In the early 1960's, Whiting was seeking money for expansion and reorganization
purposes. The Chairman of the Board of Whiting asked a business agent of Local 380 to
arrange an interview with the trustees of the fund. Local 380, however, played no part
in the negotiations which led to highly-secured loans amounting to $4.7 million. 361 F.2d
at 303.
5 154 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 60 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1965).
a The Board may seek enforcement of its orders in the court of appeals for the
circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
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ployer is justified in refusing to bargain with a union local that is subject to
a potential conflict of interest. Therefore, the case was remanded for the
Board to assess the potentiality, rather than just the actuality, of conflict
of interest,7
 and to establish guidelines for the unions so that their future
investment policies and practices will not create such potentiality.
In the past, the function of labor unions was to organize and represent
groups of employees in their attempts to obtain from their employers better
wages and working conditions, and other benefits. 8 As a result of their success
in achieving these objectives, the unions have more recently assumed a
second function, that of managing employee pension funds capitalized by
employers.° Therefore, the unions now have a dual function: they are both
bargaining agents and investment managers for their members. Occasionally,
one function conflicts with the other, and either the Board or the courts are
called upon to resolve the conflict 10 The absence of any legislation dealing
specifically with this dual function requires the Board and the courts to
consider the broader policy aspects not only of labor law, but of other areas
of the law as well.
In Buttrick, the court's holding was substantially based on labor law
policy with respect to the collective bargaining process, as set out by the
Board in a previous conflict of interest case, Bausch & Lomb Optical Co."
In that case, the employer refused to bargain because the local union was
also its business competitor. 12 The Board upheld the employer's refusal on
the ground that "collective bargaining is a two-sided proposition; it does
not exist unless both parties enter the negotiations in a good faith effort to
reach a satisfactory agreement." 13 A labor union casts doubt on its good
faith when it enters into bargaining while holding business interests adverse
to those of its employer?' Asserting that the probability that a union would
have to protect a loan made to a competitor of the employer with whom it
is to bargain would likewise cast doubt on the union's good faith, the court
7 The term 'conflict of interest" is generally undefined and used indiscriminately.
For purposes of clarity, the following types of conflict of interest are distinguished:
(1) that state of events which exists when a person will probably acquire an interest or
duty which conflicts with an already held interest or duty; (2) that state of events
which exists when a person has interests or duties which conflict, although no action
has been taken in favor of one or the other; (3) that state of events which exists when
a person has interests or duties which conflict, and action has been taken in favor of
one or the other. What the Buttrick court characterized as potential conffict of interest
is the first category.
8 See Cox, The Evolution of Labor-Management Relations Law, in Law and the
National Labor Policy 1, 2 (1960).
9 Note, Union Investment in Business: A Source of Union Conflicts of Interest, 46
Minn L. Rev. 573, 574 (1962).
10 For a discussion of case law in the area, see id. at 576-82.
11 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
12 Id. at 1558-59.
13 Id. at 1559.
14 The majority in Bausch & Lomb believed this would cause the employer to
suspect the local's motives and objectives, and thus would make successful bargaining
virtually impossible. Id. at 1561. The concurring opinion did not discuss the collective
bargaining process, but stated only that holding business interests was "not consistent
with good-faith bargaining on the part of a union." Id. at 1563.
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in Buttrick concluded that such probability relieves an employer of his duty
to bargain 15
In establishing its standard as potential conflict, the court also considered
the rationale of conflict of interest law. Generally, the law prohibits trustees
and public officials from holding interests which conflict with their fiduciary
or public duties.' 6
 The purpose of the federal conflict of interest statutes'
for example, is to prevent government corruption by eliminating the tempta-
tions which give rise to it. 18
 Thus, this law forbids the holding of interests
which actually do conflict.lo In Buttrick, the effect of the court's standard
is to preclude locals from bargaining when they may be subject to a conflict
of interest. In borrowing fiduciary principles from other areas of the law, the
court has restricted union investments to a greater extent than the government
has restricted its employees' investments. Thus, the court's analogy to federal
conflict of interest law may be inapposite.
Having stated the standard to be one of potential conflict, the court ap-
plied the facts before it to that standard and suggested that Local 380 was
subject to a potential conflict of interest 2 0 It is doubtful, however, that the
court's application yields the suggested conclusion. The only way that Local
380's alleged conflict of interest could harm Buttrick would be for the General
President of the Teamsters Union to give preference to his duty as a trustee
of the pension fund and order Local 380 to take action adverse to the interests
of Buttrick. In addition, Local 380 would have to act in accordance with
his orders. It is submitted that, under these circumstances, contrary to the
court's analysis, the General President would have no power to lawfully com-
pel Local 380 to carry out his orders, 21
 and, therefore, that there is no poten-
tial conflict of interest.
To support its contention that Local 380 is subservient to the Teamsters
Union, the court examined certain powers the General President may exert
over Local 380. 22
 First, the Teamsters constitution empowers him to put a
local into trusteeship in the event the local acts "to jeopardize the interests of
the International Union, or its subordinate bodies . . . ."23
 This power, how-
ever, is limited by Section 302 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959:
15 361 F.2d at 307.
16 Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360, 89 A.L.R.2d 612 (1960). See gener-
ally Bogert, Trusts § 95 (4th ed. 1963).
17 76 Stat. 1124 (1962), 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1964), supplanting 62 Stat. 703 (1948).
Compare Special Committee on the Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Conflict of Interest and Federal Service 279 (1960).
18 United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 550 & n.14
(1961), construing 62 Stat. 703 (1948).
10 76 Stat. 1124 (1962), 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1964).
20 361 F.2d at 308.
21 It should be noted that the court limited itself to a consideration of the Presi-
dent's de jure powers over local affiliates. 361 F.2d at 303 n.5. Whether he could, in fact,
and beyond the scope of the power given him by the union constitution, compel Local
380 to do his will is a wholly different problem. See generally James, Hoffa and the
Teamsters—A Study in Union Power (1965).
22 361 F.2d at 308.
23 Teamsters Int'l Const. art. VI, § 5(a) (1966).
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Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor
organization over a subordinate body only in accordance with the
constitution and bylaws of the organization which has assumed
trusteeship over the subordinate body and for the purpose of correct-
ing corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of
collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining rep-
resentative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying
out the legitimate objects of such labor organization.24
The establishment of a trusteeship by the General President in order to coerce
Local 380 to bargain in such a way as to injure itself and the employer with
whom it bargains would not be "legitimate" within the meaning of the stat-
ute.25 A trusteeship is a device whereby an international union may control
a subsidiary local in the event of the local's wrongdoing; it is not a device for
a contrary purpose, e.g., to enable a union to compel the unwilling local
to carry out the international's illegitimate objectives."
The second power examined by the court is that the President can order
the local to submit its collective bargaining agreements to the review of the
union, and in the event that such agreements provide for working conditions
and wages which do not measure up to those prevailing in the local's area,
can compel the local to await the approval of the union. 27 Should Local 380,
in order to assist Buttrick to continue or reestablish business, decide to
accept less than average wages in its area, the union would be able to review
that decision. The General President's duty as a trustee of the fund might
prompt him, on review, to protect Whiting. But the court does not state how
the President might protect Whiting, and the power to review the local's agree-
ments does not include or establish the power to compel the local to injure
Buttrick.
Third, the President has the power to order Local 380 to arbitrate 28 and
to refrain from a strike." The court attempted to show by hypothesis that
these powers establish and include the power to compel Local 380 to injure
Buttrick: if Local 380 were to demand higher than average wages and would
be willing to strike for them, the President, in order to protect Whiting from
the possible chain effect of wage escalation, might order Local 380 either to
arbitrate or not to strike." Such an order, however, would benefit Buttrick
as well as Whiting.31 Therefore, in hypothesizing, the court contradicted its
fundamental assumption that the Teamsters Union would seek to injure But-
trick in order to benefit Whiting.
The court failed, moreover, to realize that Local 380 would be unwilling
24 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1964).
25 Compare United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872, 882-83 (10th
Cir. 1965). See generally Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor
Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 850 (1960).
26 See Bureau of National Affairs, The Labor Reform Law 42 -43 (1959).
27 Teamsters Int'l Const. art. XII, §§ 11(a), (d) (1966).
28 Id. art. VI, § 3.
29 Id. art. XII, § 1(c).
30 361 F.2d at 308.
31 Whatever might be the General President's motives, the effect. of his order would
be to protect Buttrick from the harmful consequences of a strike by Local 380.
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to acquiesce in the President's orders because it would be contrary to its
interests to do so. Unlike the trustee or the public official at whom conflict of
interest laws are directed, and unlike the competitor-local in Bausch & Lomb,
Local 380 has nothing to gain and much to lose by acting in accordance with
the President's demands." In addition, the court did not consider that Local
380 has a statutory right to refuse to acquiesce in the demands of the Team-
sters Union. Section 2(a) of the LMRDA states that the policy of the act is
"to protect employees' rights to organize, choose their own representatives,
bargain collectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection . ."33 Ordering Local 380 to bargain to the detri-
ment of Buttrick would be an infringement upon the collective bargaining
rights of Local 380 and a violation of section 2 (a).34
 Furthermore, under the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Local 380 would be violating its
duty of good faith if it engaged in collective bargaining with the sole objective
of injuring Buttrick. 35
 The Teamsters Union cannot lawfully compel Local 380
to breach its statutory obligation."
While the court strongly suggested that a potential conflict of interest
existed in Local 380, it nevertheless left the Board some latitude to reach a
contrary conclusion. In ordering the Board to "assess the potential ... of
conflict of interest,"37
 the court authorized it to apply the facts to the court's
standard of potentiality, and if warranted, to reach a conclusion which dif-
fered from that of the court. However, if, upon rehearing, the Board should
decide that Local 380 might be subject to a conflict of interest, it should, in
accordance with the court's opinion," set out guidelines for the large national
unions with respect to their investment policies and practices." In proposing
32 Local 380 ... could not in any way realize a profit by driving the Company
out of business; in fact, it would suffer a definite loss by so doing. Local 380 is
a labor organization which exists for the sole purpose of representing employees
by means of the collective bargaining process. Driving the Company out of
business would not only decrease Local 380's membership and thereby diminish
its collective bargaining strength and ability, but also it would tend to give the
impression to other employees that membership in Local 380 might similarly
lead to the eventual elimination of their jobs and thereby impede Local 380's
organizational efforts in the future.
Brief for Local 380 as Intervening Petitioner, pp. 33-34.
33 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1964).
34 Cf. NLRB v. Thompson Prods., Inc., 162 F.2d 287, 293 (6th Cir. 1947) (dic-
tum); DeBardeleben v. NLRB, 135 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1943) (dictum). Section 2(a)
restates the policy of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 7, 49 Stat. 452, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
35 See 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964); NLRB v. National Shoes,
Inc., 208 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1401, 1411-14 (1958).
30 See note 21 supra.
37 361 F.2d at 309.
38 Ibid.
35 The Board "has discretion to place appropriate limitations on the choice of bar-
gaining representatives should it find that public or statutory policies so dictate." NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1947). Therefore, the Board could
decide that a union holding business interests adverse to those of the employer with
whom it is to bargain is not "the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining." 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
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such guidelines, the Board should take care to protect the diverse interests of
large national unions, local unions, employees, and employers 4 0
One solution the Board might propose is that the large national unions
not invest in any industry in which they negotiate. 4 ' Unions, such as the
Teamsters, which negotiate in virtually all industries, should limit their in-
vestments to government bonds, savings bank notice accounts, and other
such noncommercial investments. 42 This solution, however, fails to protect
the unions' right to obtain the highest yield on their capita1.43 Although this
right is not absolute," a solution which does protect it would be more satis-
factory.
As an alternative, the Board might propose that the large national unions
detach themselves from the management of pension funds, and that wholly
independent investment trusts be established to administer the funds.45
 These
trusts would be managed by professional trustees and so structured as to allow
for diversified commercial investments." Further, union funds could be com-
mingled with the funds of other investors, as in a mutual fund, in order to
render it more difficult for the unions to have knowledge of the particular
companies in which their investments might reside. This loss of control and
dispersion of investment capital would minimize significantly the possibility
of a union conflict of interest. Moreover, under this solution, the employee-
beneficiaries of pension funds would enjoy a greater return on capital than
they would if investments were limited to noncommercial areas. 47
 Some na-
tional labor leaders might refuse to follow this solution, since it requires their
wholesale surrender of investment control." It should be noted, however, that
any such refusal could well be an invitation to more rigid controls imposed by
federal legislation." To avoid this, the unions might best protect themselves
by voluntarily conforming their investment policies to the Board's eventual
guidelines. WALTER F. KELLY, JR.
40 The court noted the following interests that require balancing: (1) the rights
of the large national unions to invest and to organize and represent those employees
who select them; (2) the rights of local unions to organize and represent the employees
who select them, and to come to the bargaining table free from the suspicion that they
are motivated by any other objective than to bargain in good faith; (3) the right of
employees to choose freely their bargaining representatives; and, (4) the right of em-
ployers to bargain in an atmosphere conducive to a good-faith settlement of grievances.
See 361 F.2d at 305-07.
41 For example, the UMW would not be allowed to invest in basic mining and
metals industries.
42 See Note, supra note 9, at 574.
48 361 F.2d at 305. See generally Brown, Personal Property 6-7 (2d ed. 1955),
dealing with the right of free alienation of personal property.
44 Reasonable restrictions may be made on the right to transfer property. Ibid.
45 Statement of Position and Supporting Brief of Respondent on remand to the
NLRB, pp. 19-20.
48 Ibid.
47 See Note, supra note 9, at 574. See generally Clendenin, Introduction to Invest-
ments 7-12 (2d ed. 1955); Dowrie & Fuller, Investments 56, 195-202 (2d ed. 1950).
48 See generally James, Hoffa's Manipulation of Pension Benefits, Ind. Rel., May
1965, p. 46.
40 Cook, The Right to Manage, 9 Lab. L.J. 187, 212 (1958). See Note, supra note
9, at 598.
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